M. KADİR DOĞAN
Department of Economics
Phone: +90(312) 595-1266
Faculty of Political Sciences
E-mail: doganmk@politics.ankara.edu.tr
Ankara University
Cebeci, Ankara
06590, Turkey
ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS
Department
of Economics, Ankara University
Associate Professor (2015 -
Present)
Assistant Professor (2010 - 2015)
Lecturer and Research Fellow (2005
- 2010)
FIELDS OF INTEREST
Microeconomics Theory, Game Theory,
Economics of Education, Analytical Political Economy
DOCTORAL STUDIES
Ph.D.
in Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA.
Dissertation: “Political Moral
Hazard”
Committee Chair: Christophe Chamley
Date of Completion: August
2005
PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES
M.A.
in Political Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA, 2004.
B.S.
in Industrial Engineering, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2000.
PUBLICATIONS
1. Doğan, M. K.
(2009). "Matching with restricted preferences." Sosyoekonomi 5(10):
109-120.
This
paper examines the effects of the introduction of restrictions on the statement
of preferences in a two–sided matching model with incomplete information. The
model is similar to the process used for college admissions in Turkey. Colleges
have unanimous preferences – students with higher ranking in the national
examinations are always preferred. We show that the introduction of the restrictions
on statement of students' preferences can result in unstable matching between
colleges and students.
2. Doğan, M. K. (2010). "Transparency and political
moral hazard." Public Choice 142(1-2):
215-235. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9485-0.
This paper analyzes the effects of asymmetric information on the public
control of politicians in a world where the politicians' pre-election promises
are not credible. We study a model with identical politicians and a
representative voter whose interests conflict with those of the politicians'.
The voter's decision to reelect the politician depends on both observable
policies of the politician and the outcome of the unobservable policies. In
equilibrium, either optimal decisions for the voter are not taken by the politician
or if taken, the politician would extract more rent. In the latter case,
politicians are also replaced more frequently.
3. Doğan, M. K. ve T.
Yuret (2010). "The effects of the restriction on statement of preference
in college admission system." Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 65(2):
59-88. (in Turkish)
The college admission system of Turkey is an example of two – sided
matching models. In this system, the candidates can choose at most twenty four
programs when they declare their preferences over the programs. The matching
formed under the restriction on statement of preference is not fair. The aim of
this paper is to determine the scale of effect due to restriction on statement
of preference by estimating the number of candidates who have justified envy in
the unfair matching that formed under the restriction on statement of
preferences. We used the data of college admission system of year 2005 in this paper. 22.6
percent of the candidates, who had stated preferences, filled all of the
choices. This ratio shows that the restriction on statement of preference is
quite significant. We predicted the preferences that candidates declare when
there is no restriction on stating preference by two different models, and
placed them to the programs by the matching algorithm that we had developed.
Results of those models show that presence of restriction on statement of
preference causes to the placement of candidates to programs with an unfair
matching, and unjustified envy on at least 2% of the candidates.
4. Yuret, T. ve M. K.
Doğan (2011). "Comparative advantage and preferences in college admissions
in Turkey." Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences 15: 1862-1865. DOI:
10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.04.016.
Each
year, approximately 2 million students compete for 200 thousand seats in
Turkish colleges. The central authority takes students' preferences and test
scores into account and place students to the limited seats of majors in the
colleges. Balinski and Sonmez (1999) note that the algorithm used in this
process is college optimal and propose a student optimal algorithm to overcome
some deficiencies. We use 2005 data-set and show that both algorithms generate
almost the same results. This reveals the simple truth in student preferences:
the students want to be in majors where their comparative advantages lay.
5. Doğan, M. K. ve T.
Yuret (2011). "The causes of gender inequality in college education in Turkey."
Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences 15: 691-695. DOI:
10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.03.166.
Participation
in college education is lower for women than men in many developing countries
including Turkey. This paper investigates the causes of this fact by using the
student selection and placement system (ÖSYS) data for the year 2005. We show
that seven factors are effective in unequal participation in college education.
We point out the issues that policies should focus on in order to increase the
participation of women in college education.
6. Doğan, M. K. (2011).
"A theory on political stability and provincial size." Proceedings
of the Thirty Eighth Annual Meeting of Northeast of Business & Economics
Association, 549-553.
This paper analyzes the
relation between political stability and the size of provinces. We study a
model in which the signal to the electorate about the politician's decision is
noisier in more highly populated provinces. The model implies that both the
equilibrium reelection probabilities of politicians and political stability are
lower in highly populated provinces.
7. Doğan, M. K.
(2012). "Encryption claims in transition to higher education exam and a
method proposal to determine whether the candidates used the encryption." Eğitim
Ve Bilim-Education and Science 37(166): 206-218. (in Turkish)
It is
claimed that the questions were encrypted in the transition to higher education
exam of year 2011, and thus the correct answers can be found by using just the
choices. The aim of this study is to
test this claim statistically. The circular mode encryption method is
applicable to 31 questions in math section and its expected success rate is
%58.7 (18.2 correct answers). It is determined that the exam was encrypted with
a probability of error less than one millionth and concluded that any method cannot
reach such high success rate without any encryption. Also, it is not possible
that encryption arises as a result of shifting the choices of questions
inadvertently when forming the new choices. The study also proposes a method to
determine whether the encryption is used by candidates or not, and if used, the
method states the candidates using it.
8. Doğan, M. K. ve T.
Yuret (2013). "Publication performance and student quality of Turkish
economics departments." Sosyoekonomi 9(19): 71-86.
We
have two objectives in this paper. First, we rank the economics departments in
Turkey according to the publication records of their faculty members. Second,
we explore the determinants of the student quality in the undergraduate
economics programs. There are 96 economics departments which offer 212
economics programs in Turkey. We find that the programs which attract
academically strong students are offered in the departments with good
publication records. We also show that credit constraints are very effective in
students’ decisions. In both private and state colleges, the students are
highly sensitive to differences in tuition fees.
9. Doğan, M. K.
(2014). " Matching theory and market design." Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 69(2):
379-405. DOI: 10.16987/ausbf.33509.
(in Turkish)
During the past 30 years, matching theory has become a rapidly growing
branch of microeconomics that analyzes the allocation, exchange and matching of
indivisible resources while using the tools of game theory and mechanism
design. The 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to two economists, Alvin
E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley, for their contributions to matching theory and
market design, highlighting the importance of these paradigms. On the other
hand, the field of matching theory is not known well in Turkey. The purpose of
this article is to contribute to the recognition of matching theory and market
design by introducing some of the fundamental models and results in this field.
Therefore, two-sided and one-sided matching markets, school choice problem,
student placement problem and market design for kidney exchange are examined in
this study.
10. Doğan, M. K. (2014). "Environmental pollution and labor supply in Turkey."
The Empirical Economics Letters 13(4): 459-465.
This
paper discusses the impacts of pollution on the labor supply in Turkey. First,
a theoretical model is presented to demonstrate the relationship between
pollution and the labor supply. Then the impacts of pollution on labor supply
are empirically investigated by using a panel data set from 81 Turkish
provinces. Contrary to the previous studies which showed that pollution impacts
negatively on labor supply, our results demonstrate that pollution does not
have significant effect on labor supply in Turkey.
11. Doğan, M. K. ve G. Bozdemir (2014). "The effects of
credibility on interest rates in Turkey." Eurasian Journal of Business
and Economics 7(14): 71-90. DOI:
10.17015/ejbe.2014.014.05.
Credibility
is crucial for managing inflation expectations in countries adopting inflation
targeting. This study focuses on measurement of credibility and its relation
with the interest rates. It aims to determine which measures of credibility
best predict the variations of interest rates by using monthly data from Turkey
in 2004−2012 period which adopted inflation targeting in 2002. Nine credibility
indices are considered in the analysis. We find empirical evidence supporting
the claim that higher credibility will lead to lower variations in interest
rates of both monetary policy and the market. We also demonstrated that CICK
(proposed by Cecchetti and Krause, 2002) is the best credibility index in
explaining the variations in both monetary policy interest rate and market
interest rate.
12.
Doğan, M. K. ve T.
Yuret (2015). "The effects of implementing different coefficients in
college admissions." Ankara
Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 70(1): 193-218. DOI: 10.16987/ausbf.56446. (in Turkish)
In the college admission system, the placement scores of the students
were computed by using different coefficients for different high school types
and graduation fields between 1999-2011 years. The aim of this policy was to
direct the students to the college programs related to their high school
education. The objective of this paper is to determine the effects of different
coefficients policy on placement results. College admissions data of year 2005
is used in the analysis. We compare the policy applying different coefficients
to the policy which applies the same coefficients. We find that general and
religious high school graduates will benefit, and teacher training and
vocational high school graduates will lose under the policy with equal
coefficients. This is because, the ratio between the number of high school
graduates from a certain field and the capacity of college programs related to
this field differs significantly among fields.
NOVEMBER
2015